March 02, 2026
The regulation of fintechs in Brazil: normative gaps in the digital financial sector
Andreas Monteiro Seiler; Sarah de Oliveira Silva dos Santos
Summary prepared by the ResumeAI tool, an artificial intelligence solution developed by the Pecege Institute focused on synthesis and writing.
The digital economy has promoted profound transformations in the dynamics of production, consumption, and interaction between individuals and financial institutions, consolidating a scenario where technology acts as the main driver of agility and service personalization. In this context, fintechs have emerged as fundamental organizations for the reconfiguration of the sector, using innovations such as artificial intelligence, big data, and blockchain to challenge the hegemony of traditional institutions and promote economic inclusion. In Brazil, this ecosystem has shown significant growth, reaching the mark of 1,481 companies, with the opening of more than 250 million digital accounts and the generation of approximately 100,000 direct jobs (Perez, 2023). This phenomenon was not restricted to the national territory, as in Latin America, the number of fintechs expanded by 340% between 2017 and 2023, according to data from the Inter-American Development Bank (Perez, 2024). However, the speed of this disruptive innovation exposed the structural slowness of regulatory frameworks and the difficulties of legal institutions in keeping up with highly scalable and efficient business models.
The theoretical basis that supports the analysis of this sector highlights that regulation must seek a delicate balance to mitigate uncertainties without stifling innovation (Arner, Barberis, and Buckley, 2016). In the Brazilian scenario, however, there is a fragmented regulatory environment, sometimes permissive with large established institutions, while lacking effective traceability instruments for new entrants. This regulatory asymmetry reinforces market concentration and restricts the transformative potential of emerging companies, perpetuating a system that is unresponsive to new social demands. Specialized literature suggests that the absence of proportional and adaptive regulation creates gray areas that are exploited by both large financial operators, supported by political capital, and criminal organizations that take advantage of oversight failures (Zetzsche et al., 2020). Therefore, the justification for deepening this topic lies in the need to understand how regulatory gaps and selective institutional practices contribute to systemic vulnerabilities, aiming to propose a fairer and more modern regulatory framework.
The detailing of the methodological procedures reveals a qualitative approach of an exploratory-analytical nature, designed to interpret the complex institutional and strategic variables of the digital financial ecosystem. The research was based on the application of semi-structured interviews with an intentional sample of 16 specialists, selected for their proven experience in different segments of regulation and the market. The group of participants consisted of four career lawyers with experience in digital and tax law, six fintech executives with direct experience in compliance processes, two strategy consultants focused on financial technology, one analyst from the Central Bank of Brazil, two university professors specialized in banking law, and one financial consultant working at B3. This diversity of profiles allowed for the capture of qualified and consistent perceptions, ensuring that the phenomenon was analyzed from multiple perspectives, from the technical view of the regulator to the operational challenges of entrepreneurs.
The data collection instrument consisted of a structured roadmap divided into four main thematic axes, designed to identify recurring patterns and contradictions in the regulatory environment. The first block investigated the selectivity in the actions of regulatory bodies, using open-ended questions to capture meanings attributed to the impartiality and effectiveness of norms (Creswell, 2014). The second axis focused on the concrete impacts of regulatory gaps, exploring the consequences of the absence of clear regulations for institutional security. The third block mapped the institutional barriers to innovation, seeking to understand the challenges faced by fintechs compared to large banks. Finally, the fourth axis promoted a comparative benchmarking with international models, inspired by approaches from the Financial Conduct Authority of the United Kingdom and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Fenwick, McCahry, and Vermeulen, 2020). Data collection took place entirely in August 2025, through digital forms that ensured anonymity and compliance with the ethical guidelines of Resolution CNS 510/2016.
The analysis of the collected data was performed using the thematic coding technique, which allowed the identification of emerging categories from the interpretive reading of the reports (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This process involved the full transcription of interviews and the organization of responses into clear categories, facilitating comparison between different interest groups. The choice of qualitative methods was justified by the opinion-based and voluntary nature of the research, where rigor lies not in statistical standardization, but in the clarity of the theoretical-methodological framework and the depth of interpretations (Minayo, 2010). Each stage of the analysis sought to confront institutional discourse with actual market practice, allowing for the mapping of enforcement failures and regulatory bottlenecks that compromise the integrity of the national financial system.
The results obtained reveal that most specialists identify a clear selectivity in the way regulatory bodies operate, benefiting institutions with greater political capital and consolidated lobbying power. While established banks operate in an environment of greater predictability, early-stage fintechs face regulatory requirements identical to those of large conglomerates, without considering differences in scale and institutional maturity. This lack of proportionality forces smaller companies to divert resources from technology and innovation to cover robust compliance structures and complex periodic reports, which ultimately restricts their ability to compete on equal terms. This scenario corroborates the perception that the Brazilian regulatory structure is more limiting than favorable to innovation, becoming an obstacle for startups that do not have the same financial backing as incumbents.
One of the most critical points discussed concerns the system’s vulnerability to organized crime, evidenced by recent police and tax operations. The data show that criminal organizations used fintechs to move and launder approximately R$ 52 billion between 2020 and 2024, exploiting regulatory loopholes to act as parallel banks. Episodes such as operations Quasar, Tank, and Carbono Oculto revealed that the lack of effective traceability instruments and the delay in regulatory response allowed the infiltration of illicit practices in the digital financial sector. The public authorities’ response, through normative instructions from the Federal Revenue Service that equated the transparency obligations of fintechs to those of traditional banks, was seen by respondents as a necessary, but late and reactive, measure. This dynamic demonstrates that the Brazilian state tends to act only after crises of great repercussion, failing to proactively anticipate risks and map vulnerabilities.
The discussion on institutional selectivity becomes even clearer when analyzing cases of complaints against major market players, such as the one involving XP Investimentos in 2024. The episode, which involved accusations of controversial commercial practices and misleading advertising, resulted in a regulatory response considered mild and insufficient by the consulted specialists. The prevailing perception is that large operators enjoy greater fiscal tolerance, while emerging fintechs are subjected to rigorous scrutiny from the beginning of their operations. This mismatch not only distorts competition but also weakens institutional trust, as the market perceives the existence of different standards for different actors. Literature indicates that this regulatory capture by incumbents is a common phenomenon in transitioning markets, but it must be combated to ensure the system’s resilience (Black, 2019).
When comparing the Brazilian model with international benchmarks, the results indicate that the country still lacks clear normative segmentation. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority adopts mechanisms that differentiate companies based on risk and size, allowing new entrants to operate gradually. Similarly, in Singapore, the Monetary Authority applies a modular licensing regime that stimulates innovation without sacrificing prudential supervision. In contrast, Brazil continues to operate with fragmented regulations among the Central Bank, the CVM, and the Federal Revenue Service, which generates overlapping responsibilities and legal uncertainty. The absence of structured listening channels and permanent innovation forums prevents the regulator from keeping pace with technological transformations, such as asset tokenization and the advancement of decentralized finance.
Regulatory volatility was also identified as a significant barrier, with abrupt changes in institutional orientation discouraging long-term investments. Experts highlighted that the lack of an institutional policy for regulatory stability forces companies to reconfigure internal processes in a short period, substantially increasing operational costs. For fintechs, this can mean the economic unviability of their business models, while for large banks it represents only marginal adjustments. This structural asymmetry reinforces the trend of market concentration and weakens the competitive dynamism that new technologies could provide. The development of a more stable and predictable regulatory framework is seen as an indispensable condition for ensuring investor confidence and attracting international capital.
Another relevant aspect discussed was the implementation of Open Finance in Brazil, which, despite being a technological advancement, received criticism for its excessive dependence on large banks. Interviewees pointed out that low interoperability and centralized governance hinder fintechs’ access to the data needed to offer more personalized services. This unequal access to the regulatory formulation process was frequently associated with the perception of capture, where incumbents manage to shape regulations in their favor, creating entry barriers for new competitors. The need to institutionalize more inclusive participation channels and periodic regulatory impact reports was advocated as a way to ensure greater transparency and accountability in the system.
The study’s methodological limitations, such as the small sample size of experts, prevent the statistical generalization of findings but do not invalidate the depth of the perceptions captured. The research identified that Brazilian regulation is not neutral and that the absence of formal proportionality guidelines has resulted in a dysfunctional model that penalizes innovation. The urgency of structural reforms is evident, especially to strengthen inter-institutional coordination and avoid regulatory overlap that confuses the market. The challenge for the coming years will be to transition from reactive regulation to a preventive and adaptive model capable of protecting consumers and systemic stability without stifling the creative potential of new financial technologies.
It is concluded that the objective was achieved by demonstrating that regulatory gaps and institutional selectivity in Brazil create an environment of legal uncertainty that favors market concentration and exposes the system to criminal vulnerabilities. The analysis showed that current regulation is predominantly reactive, acting only after scandals or systemic crises occur, which compromises the integrity of the digital financial sector. The comparison with international models reinforced the need for a reform that adopts proportionality as a central pillar, allowing fintechs to operate under rules compatible with their size and risk. Overcoming these bottlenecks will require the creation of more transparent governance mechanisms and the institutionalization of participation channels that limit regulatory capture by incumbents, ensuring a more competitive, innovative, and secure ecosystem for all stakeholders involved.
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