October 26, 2026
Critical analysis and identification of failures in the internal controls and compliance system in a multinational organization
Alessandra de Aquino Santos; Beatriz da Silva Pereira
DOI: 10.22167/2675-6528-202600488
Article derived from a Course Conclusion Work (TCC), with content based on the student’s original work and adapted to the editorial format of the E&S Magazine with the support of the ResumeAI tool, an artificial intelligence solution developed by Instituto Pecege for textual synthesis and organization.
Summary
The growing digitalization of multinational organizations and the tightening of regulatory requirements in compliance and data protection have imposed on internal control systems the need to articulate formal robustness with operational effectiveness. The study aimed to analyze the internal control and compliance system of a multinational organization in the telecommunications sector in Brazil, identifying structural weaknesses and opportunities for improvement in light of the COSO framework, the Anti-Corruption Law, and the General Personal Data Protection Law, with an emphasis on the risks revealed by a cyber incident. A qualitative approach was adopted, operationalized by a single revelatory case study, with triangulation between a semi-structured interview conducted with the management of the internal control area, a structured questionnaire applied to operational employees, and documentary analysis. The data were treated by content analysis, with analytical categories derived from the five COSO components. The findings evidenced a high degree of formalization of governance structures, with substantial adherence to the requirements of the Anti-Corruption Law and the General Personal Data Protection Law. However, specific weaknesses were identified in the continuous monitoring component, in the periodic assessment of technological risks, and in the transversal integration between controlling, compliance, and information technology. The cyber incident acted as a revealing element of these gaps and motivated the proposal of a remediation plan articulated in three temporal horizons of implementation. Corporate resilience emerged as a product of the articulation between governance, technology, and organizational culture.
Keywords: Risk management; Corporate governance; Cyber incident; Information security; Telecommunications sector.
1. Introduction
The growing acceleration of digital transformation has imposed on multinational organizations a substantial reconfiguration of their internal control and compliance systems. This scenario demands a more robust articulation between structural formality and operational effectiveness, especially in sectors that deal with large volumes of data and critical infrastructures.
The telecommunications sector, in particular, stands out for its strategic position as essential infrastructure and for its intense dependence on data, characteristics that make it highly exposed to operational and cyber risks. The materialization of these risks can entail significant financial and reputational consequences. According to the Cost of Data Breach Report by International Business Machines (IBM), the global average cost of a data breach incident reached USD 4.88 million in 2024, representing the largest percentage increase compared to the previous year since the pandemic, with 70% of affected organizations reporting disruptions in their operations (IBM, 2024).
In Brazil, the regulatory environment became even more complex and demanding with the enactment of Law No. 13.709/2018, the General Data Protection Law (LGPD), and Law No. 12.846/2013, the Anti-Corruption Law. These legislations raised the standards of corporate governance, risk assessment, and the need for continuous monitoring. The Compliance Maturity Survey in Brazil, conducted by Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) in 2024, with 106 medium and large organizations, identified an average maturity index of 3.09 on a scale of one to five. The risk assessment component registered the lowest score, 2.8, evidencing persistent structural weaknesses even in companies formally committed to compliance (KPMG, 2024).
In this context, the concept of compliance designates the structured set of policies, processes, and control mechanisms adopted by an organization. Its purpose is to ensure conformity with laws, regulations, technical standards, and ethical standards applicable to its activities, both external, such as national and international legislation, and internal, through codes of conduct and corporate policies. The effectiveness of these systems is often evaluated in light of recognized frameworks, such as that of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2013), which offers guidelines for the management of internal controls.
Scientific literature has advanced in analyzing the effectiveness of internal controls as a mechanism for mitigating corporate risks. Marotta and Madnick (2021), investigating the relationship between regulatory compliance and cybersecurity across multiple sectors, demonstrated that adherence to normative requirements, while necessary, is not sufficient to ensure organizational security. Organizations formally in compliance may still present relevant gaps in their protection posture. In addition, Kelton and Yang (2024) showed that the quality of internal controls plays a significant moderating role in investors’ risk perception, but this quality is rarely evaluated from the perspective of real operational effectiveness against emerging threats.
Therefore, gaps are identified in research that articulates, in a single applied case, the critical evaluation of formally structured controls with the examination of weaknesses revealed by real incidents, especially in multinational telecommunications companies. In this environment, the intersection between data governance, technological risk, and regulatory compliance remains underexplored. Formally consolidated governance structures, aligned with the COSO framework and national regulations such as the LGPD and the Anti-Corruption Law, can coexist with critical operational vulnerabilities, especially given the increasing sophistication of cyber threats and the fragmentation of corporate digital environments.
The relevance of this research lies in the need to produce empirical evidence that supports the improvement of internal control and compliance systems in multinational companies, subjected to the dual regulatory pressure of origin markets and Brazilian standards. According to Garcia-Perez et al. (2023), the telecommunications sector, by processing significant volumes of sensitive data and relying on highly interconnected digital infrastructures, represents a high-risk environment, in which the integration between controlling, compliance, and information technology is a determining factor for organizational resilience. The critical analysis of a real-world cyber incident case allows not only the identification of specific gaps but also offers contributions applicable to the review and strengthening process of internal controls in organizations with a similar profile, expanding the scope of academic and managerial discussions on the effectiveness of governance programs. Thus, the objective of this work is to analyze the internal control and compliance system of a multinational organization in the telecommunications sector operating in Brazil, identifying structural weaknesses and improvement opportunities in light of the COSO framework, the Anti-Corruption Law, and the LGPD, with an emphasis on the risks revealed by a cyber incident and the need for integration between the controlling, compliance, and information technology functions.
2. Material and Methods
This research was characterized as descriptive-interpretive, with a qualitative approach, operationalized through a single case study. The descriptive nature of the study sought to systematize the characteristics and functioning of the internal controls and compliance system of a specific organization. The interpretive character was justified by the understanding of formally instituted structures in the face of a critical event, while the qualitative approach allowed access to organizational dimensions not measurable by quantitative indicators (Gil, 2022; Yin, 2016).
The single case study strategy was adopted due to its suitability for investigating contemporary organizational phenomena in a real context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly delimited (Yin, 2018). A revelatory case was configured, where the occurrence of a cyber incident in a multinational telecommunications organization operating in Brazil allowed for an in-depth analysis.
The unit of analysis consisted of the internal controls and compliance system of the aforementioned multinational telecommunications organization. The theoretical anchoring of the research was based on the framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2013), Law No. 12.846/2013 (Anti-Corruption Law), and Law No. 13.709/2018 (General Law for the Protection of Personal Data – LGPD).
For data collection, three primary sources were used: semi-structured interview, structured questionnaire, and documentary analysis. Triangulation between these methods and sources was employed to reinforce the construct validity of the research, crossing the reports of management, the perceptions of operational collaborators, and documentary records (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Yin, 2018).
The research participants included a manager from the Internal Controls area and two operational collaborators from the organization. The manager had twelve years of tenure in the organization and nineteen years of experience in the field, conferring analytical depth to their report (Patton, 2015). The operational collaborators were selected for their direct experience in control routines.
The semi-structured interview with the manager was conducted on December 15, 2025, via videoconference on the Microsoft Teams platform, lasting approximately sixty minutes. The responses were recorded by manual annotation during the session, in accordance with the Organization’s internal policy which prohibits audio recordings. The structured questionnaire was sent by email to the two operational collaborators on December 02, 2025, with a written return.
The documentary analysis comprised five internal materials made available by the Organization: the internal controls manual, the compliance policy, the code of conduct, the privacy and data protection policy, and the annual sustainability report regarding ESG practices. Each document was examined according to a specific protocol, guided by formal adherence to the requirements of COSO, the Anti-Corruption Law, and the LGPD, by the internal coherence of policies, and by the traceability of the cyber incident.
The collected data were submitted to content analysis, according to the method proposed by Bardin (2016), operationalized in three sequential stages. In the pre-analysis, a floating reading of the materials was carried out, the corpus was constituted, and the a priori analytical categories, derived from the five components of the COSO framework and the regulatory requirements of the Anti-Corruption Law and LGPD, were defined.
In the material exploration stage, the corpus was subjected to systematic coding, with the allocation of excerpts to their respective categories and the recording of evidence. The emergence of unforeseen categories was also admitted when the material signaled dimensions relevant to the phenomenon investigated, such as tensions between areas and discrepancies between formal policy and operational practice.
In the treatment stage, inferences were constructed from the confrontation between the allocated evidence and the theoretical framework, with a view to identifying consonances, contradictions, and indications of structural failures. The research’s methodological design, articulating the case, the theoretical anchoring, the data collection instruments, the triangulation, and the analysis stages, was systematized to guide the investigation.
All data were treated in an anonymized manner, in compliance with the General Law on Personal Data Protection (Brazil, 2018), and the confidentiality policy was agreed upon with the participants. From the analytical triangulation conducted, a proposition for a remediation plan was systematized, articulated around the five components of COSO, with specific actions and a temporal horizon for implementation.
3. Results and Discussion
The analysis of the internal controls and compliance system of the multinational organization in the telecommunications sector revealed a scenario of formal robustness, but with significant operational fragilities, especially evidenced by the occurrence of a cyber incident. The findings were structured based on the five components of the COSO framework, complemented by the assessment of adherence to Brazilian anti-corruption and data protection legislation, and culminated in the proposal of a remediation plan. It was observed that the formalization of governance structures was in line with regulatory requirements, however, the practical effectiveness of internal controls presented critical gaps, particularly in technological risk management and continuous monitoring.
Control environment
The control environment component demonstrated a consolidated formal structure, aligned with the parameters of the COSO framework (2013). The organization possessed a Social Statute, corporate governance policies that disciplined decision-making criteria and transparency, and a formalized Code of Conduct. Segregation of duties mechanisms, decision-making authority policies, and a structured program of continuous integrity training were also established. Documentary analysis confirmed the formalization of these elements, verified in institutional manuals, the compliance policy, and the code of conduct, indicating a high degree of documentary compliance with best governance practices.
Despite the formalization, the questionnaire applied to operational collaborators revealed a disconnect between management’s strategic declaration and daily experience. Although there was unanimous recognition of the roles and responsibilities of the internal control areas and the existence of formal forums to address risks and compliance, only one out of two operational collaborators perceived an active incentive for risk prevention and integrity in their routines. This discrepancy suggests that the declared integrity culture does not always translate into consistent practice in daily operations, a finding that aligns with studies such as Castro et al. (2019), which point to the need for validation of formality through daily practice.
The tension between formal declaration and operational practice is a central point in the specialized literature. Farias et al. (2010) and Carioca et al. (2010) had already emphasized that the effectiveness of frameworks such as COSO and the implementation of regulatory requirements depend on the cultural internalization of controls by employees. The perception of the employees of the examined organization, where the culture of integrity is not actively manifested for everyone, reinforces the idea that formal robustness, by itself, does not eliminate the need for constant cultural activation and continuous engagement to ensure the effectiveness of internal controls.
Risk assessment
In the risk assessment component, the organization presented a formally instituted structure, but with operational gaps that became critical in the face of the cybernetic incident of July 2025. The interviewee reported the existence of a structured risk management process, with scheduled reviews and an updated risk matrix. Document analysis confirmed the formal risk management policy and the re-evaluation procedures recorded in the internal controls manual, indicating a solid basis for threat identification and treatment.
However, the manager acknowledged that the semi-annual periodicity of reassessments was inadequate to keep pace with the speed of evolution of cyber threats. Furthermore, the risks associated with the infrastructure contracted from public cloud providers were not reflected with the necessary degree of criticality in the matrix in force before the incident. Operational collaborators, although aware of the risk mitigation measures, indicated that not all functional areas actively participated in the reassessment cycles, which indicates a fragmentation in the approach to technological risk management and a potential underestimation of emerging vulnerabilities.
The absence of specific Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) for cybersecurity was a gap recognized by management, and the semiannual reassessment frequency was considered insufficient in an environment of constantly and rapidly evolving cyber threats. This finding corroborates the perspective of Paulo et al. (2007), who argue that the effectiveness of control is not limited to its formal existence but requires continuous evaluation of the mechanism’s capacity to mitigate risks. The organization, by operating with a static matrix reviewed in long cycles, demonstrated a fragility in the reassessment cadence that did not keep pace with the speed of emerging threats, especially in cloud infrastructures.
Marotta and Madnick (2021) deepen this discussion by demonstrating that regulatory compliance, although necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee organizational security, especially when risk assessment is conducted in cycles that detach from the real threat profile. The findings of the organization examined, where the public cloud infrastructure remained outside the priority focus of the risk matrix until the incident, corroborate this perspective. The formal reassessment cycle did not incorporate, in a timely manner, risks whose materialization generated systemic consequences, evidencing the need for a more robust integration between information technology, risk management, and business areas, according to Garcia-Perez et al. (2023).
Control activities
Control activities represented one of the most formally structured components among the five COSO dimensions in the organization. The interviewee described the operation of a diversified set of preventive and detective mechanisms, including segregation of duties, decision-making authority policies, periodic reconciliations, access controls to systems based on the principle of least privilege, and a program of semi-annual internal audits. Document analysis confirmed the formalization of these mechanisms in the internal controls manual and the compliance policy, with well-defined descriptions of responsibilities and operational flows.
The questionnaire applied to operational collaborators indicated unanimous recognition that the systems used allowed for transaction traceability and partial integration between areas. However, two critical findings emerged: the absence of continuous automated monitoring of the contracted public cloud infrastructure, recognized by management only after the incident, and the lag between the cadence of semi-annual internal audits and the speed at which new cyber threat vectors emerge in the digital environment. These points reveal that, although traditional control activities were robust, there was a gap in adapting to new technological paradigms.
The consolidation of evidence indicates that, of the aspects examined in the control activities, five were fully operational before the incident. However, cloud infrastructure monitoring was characterized by the manager as insufficient, and performance indicators showed partial coverage, without specific cybersecurity KPIs. This situation converges with the framework of Oliveira and Soares (2018), who identified the internal control policy as a determinant for the effectiveness of operational risk management, but highlighted the need for specific monitoring for failures in information technology systems, which cannot be resolved solely with traditional control activities.
The absence of continuous automated monitoring in public cloud infrastructure constitutes a gap that, according to Kelton and Yang (2024), tends to amplify the contagion effects of cyber incidents. Investors price the quality of internal controls as a risk moderating factor, and the examined organization illustrates how the robustness of traditional controls did not prevent the incident, as the exploited vector was located in a control dimension whose operational monitoring was below the maturity level of the rest of the system. This underscores the importance of adapting control activities to the dynamics of emerging technological threats.
Information and communication
In the information and communication component, the organization presented a consolidated formal structure, with open reporting channels, a widely disseminated code of conduct, and a periodic training program. The interviewee reported that the reporting channel operated under secrecy, with receipt via a digital platform and handling conducted by a dedicated area, including investigation and application of disciplinary measures. Document analysis confirmed the existence of a formal reporting policy, case registration, and feedback procedures for whistleblowers, demonstrating a formal commitment to transparency and ethics.
The two operational collaborators stated they were aware of the code of conduct and the whistleblowing channel, having identified open channels for reporting suggestions and risks. However, a disconnect emerged between the declared structure and the actual capacity for transversal communication. The cyber incident revealed that critical information between the compliance area and the information technology area was flowing through fragmented channels, creating a communication blind spot that compromised the integrated response to the emerging risk. This fragmentation was decisive in the delay of the response to the incident, despite the existence of functional communication channels for the individual employee.
Of the five formal elements of information and communication examined, four (80%) were fully operational. The integration protocol between technical and compliance areas, however, showed fragmentation, characterized by management as a factor that delayed the incident response. The identified fragility, therefore, was not located in the channels aimed at the individual employee, but in the cross-functional communication flows between corporate functions. Garcia-Perez, Sallos, and Tiwasing (2023) argue that the response to crises in critical infrastructure organizations essentially depends on the fluidity of communication between areas with distinct human, structural, and relational capital, which reinforces the need to overcome the observed fragmentation.
Cybersecurity incident and monitoring
The monitoring component was configured as the dimension in which the organization presented the greatest distance between the formal structure and operational effectiveness. Institutional monitoring was conducted mainly by semi-annual internal audits, complemented by ad-hoc reviews and self-assessments. Document analysis confirmed the formalization of this program and the existence of an annual audit schedule. However, the manager acknowledged that the semi-annual periodicity was incompatible with the speed of evolution of cyber threats and the reconfiguration dynamics of the public cloud infrastructure.
The incident that occurred in July 2025 resulted in the exposure of customers’ personal data and the identification of vulnerabilities in the cloud environment’s configuration. Management characterized the occurrence as a determining factor for the adoption of improvement measures, including the redesign of the monitoring program, the inclusion of automated detection mechanisms, the review of the technological risk matrix, and the strengthening of integration between controlling, compliance, and information technology. The interval of approximately four months between the last formal internal audit and the incident detection, without specific automated continuous monitoring, revealed a critical gap in proactive detection capability.
The fragility in the monitoring component is recurrent even in organizations with a formally constituted risk matrix, according to Façanha et al. (2020), who concluded that the effectiveness of monitoring depends on short reassessment cycles and instruments that keep pace with the speed of risk mutation. Oliveira and Soares (2018) identified that failures in information technology systems demand specific and continuous monitoring, distinct from traditional internal audit cycles. The organization’s trajectory, with the improvement of monitoring triggered only after the incident, illustrates a reactive dynamic that needs to be overcome by automated preventive architectures, requiring simultaneous investment in monitoring technology and departmental integration.
Compliance with the Anti-Corruption Law and the General Law on Personal Data Protection
The analysis of the organization’s adherence to the regulatory requirements of the Anti-Corruption Law (Brazil, 2013) and the General Law on Personal Data Protection (Brazil, 2018) indicated a scenario of high formalization, with differentiated degrees of operational effectiveness. Regarding the Anti-Corruption Law, the interviewee reported that the organization adopted a zero-tolerance policy for cases of corruption and fraud, with rigorous investigations of complaints, an operational whistleblowing channel, a widely disseminated code of conduct, and an integrity program aligned with the parameters of Decree No. 11.129/2022 (Brazil, 2022). These elements demonstrate a robust formal commitment to anti-corruption compliance.
For the LGPD, the organization had a data protection officer (DPO), a formalized privacy policy, access controls based on the principle of least privilege, and a specific training program for employees who handled personal data. Document analysis confirmed the formal existence of these elements. However, the cyber incident exposed a specific fragility in the practical application of the data protection regime, as the affected cloud infrastructure contained personal customer data whose access was not sufficiently contained by technical mechanisms, despite the existence of adequate formal policies and the designation of a DPO.
Among the items examined regarding the Anti-Corruption Law’s integrity program (code of conduct, whistleblowing channel, anti-corruption policy, and training), four (100%) were documentarily established and highly operationally effective. For the LGPD requirements, five out of six items examined (DPO designation, privacy policy, access controls, specific training, and communication to data subjects) were fully operational before the incident. However, the technical response to incidents in a contracted cloud environment presented an insufficient degree of operationalization, a gap revealed by the July 2025 incident. The activation of the communication protocol to data subjects and the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) was conducted after the incident, as provided for in Article 48 of the LGPD.
The organization’s findings converge with the national pattern identified by Castro et al. (2019), which indicate that publicly traded Brazilian companies demonstrate substantial adherence to the integrity program parameters of the Anti-Corruption Law, with higher levels of adoption correlated to higher levels of internal control implementation. The organization confirms this pattern, but, as Marotta and Madnick (2021) warn, regulatory compliance can be a minimum safety threshold, insufficient to replace a comprehensive and integrated cyber risk management strategy. Formal adherence to the LGPD did not prevent the materialization of the failure in a cloud environment, revealing that formal compliance and technical effectiveness are distinct dimensions of organizational performance.
Remediation plan proposal
From analytical triangulation, a remediation plan proposal was systematized, articulated around the five components of COSO, with specific actions and implementation time horizons. This plan converts identified weaknesses into improvement opportunities, articulating immediate (up to three months), intermediate (three to twelve months), and structural (over twelve months) responses, following the suggestion by Garcia-Perez et al. (2023) that corporate resilience in critical sectors depends on the simultaneous articulation of short, medium, and long-term investments. The plan emphasizes the transition from a reactive monitoring model to a continuous and automated architecture, especially in dynamic technological environments.
The fundamental premises of the plan include the migration to continuous and automated monitoring, as recommended by Kelton and Yang (2024), who demonstrate greater effectiveness in mitigating cyber incidents. The second premise is the need for effective integration between controlling, compliance, and information technology, overcoming departmental fragmentation that created blind spots in incident preparation. The third premise consists of reinforcing the culture of the control environment, ensuring that the formal declaration of integrity is supported by visible and accessible operational routines in the daily lives of employees, an institutional commitment to risk prevention, a perspective shared by Castro et al. (2019) and Façanha et al. (2020).
The effectiveness of the proposed remediation plan depends less on the quantity of additional mechanisms instituted and more on the qualitative articulation between the layers of governance, technology, and organizational culture. The cyber incident that occurred in the examined organization did not result from the absence of a formal structure for internal controls and compliance, but rather from a specific mismatch between the formal maturity of the system and the operational capacity for monitoring, detection, and interdepartmental integration in the face of emerging technological risks. The proposed remediation seeks to close this gap in an integrated and sustainable manner, addressing the five components of COSO and the regulatory requirements of the Anti-Corruption Law and the LGPD.
In summary, the research findings revealed that the multinational organization possesses a formally robust system of internal controls and compliance, aligned with pertinent frameworks and legislation. However, operational effectiveness was compromised by gaps in continuous monitoring of technological risks, periodic assessment of cyber threats in cloud environments, and cross-functional communication between the areas of controlling, compliance, and information technology. The cyber incident acted as a catalyst, exposing these fragilities and driving the need for a remediation plan that articulates governance, technology, and organizational culture to build corporate resilience.
4. Conclusion
The present study aimed to analyze the internal control and compliance system of a multinational organization in the telecommunications sector operating in Brazil, seeking to identify structural weaknesses and opportunities for improvement in light of the COSO framework, the Anti-Corruption Law, and the General Personal Data Protection Law, with an emphasis on the risks revealed by a cyber incident and the need for integration between the controlling, compliance, and information technology functions. It was found that, although the organization possessed a high degree of formalization in its governance structures and substantial adherence to relevant legislation, there were critical operational gaps. Weaknesses were identified in the continuous monitoring component, in the periodic assessment of technological risks, especially in cloud environments, and in the transversal integration between the controlling, compliance, and information technology areas. The cyber incident acted as a catalyst, exposing these deficiencies and motivating the proposal of a remediation plan. This plan, articulated in temporal horizons, constitutes the main practical contribution of the study, by proposing the transition from a reactive monitoring model to a continuous and automated architecture, effective integration between corporate functions, and the cultural reinforcement of the control environment, aiming at building corporate resilience.
The study’s limitations include the temporal scope, which prevented the analysis of a pre-incident baseline and the longitudinal verification of the sustainability of remediation measures in the medium term. Furthermore, the single case study nature in the telecommunications sector restricts the direct translatability of findings to other distinct regulatory and technological contexts, although analytical generalization is possible. For future studies, it is suggested to conduct comparative analyses between organizations of different sectors and sizes, verify the sustainability of remediation measures in the medium term, and examine the role of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and automation, in reconfiguring continuous monitoring mechanisms. The consolidation of this research agenda will contribute to a deeper understanding of the conditions under which formal compliance effectively translates into operational resilience.
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