Article

Lucila Raquel Almeida; Julia Pinto Komka

DOI: 10.22167/2675-6528-202602561

Article derived from a Final Course Work (TCC), with content based on the student’s original work and adapted to the editorial format of the E&S Magazine with the support of the ResumeAI tool, an artificial intelligence solution developed by the Pecege Institute for textual synthesis and organization.

Abstract

The 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul highlighted structural fragilities in public governance within a federal context subjected to extreme climate risk. This work analyzed, in the temporal scope of May 2024 to May 2025, how federal, state, and municipal actions were structured in the face of the crisis and to what extent the comparison with the Netherlands offered useful parameters for strengthening institutional resilience. The research adopted a qualitative, applied, exploratory, and comparative approach, with documentary analysis and content analysis of official sources, international technical reports, normative acts, and institutional pronouncements, organized by thematic categories and interpreted with the support of the IIA’s Three Lines Model. The results showed that, although the three levels of government created or restructured relevant coordination and reconstruction instruments after the disaster, a reactive, post-event institutional framework prevailed, with gaps in administrative continuity, preventive integration, monitoring, and accountability. In the international comparison, the Dutch model stood out for combining permanent operational authority, clear territorial base, its own financing, and more robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms. It was concluded that the impacts of the floods were aggravated less by the formal absence of regulations and more by the insufficient articulation between operations, risk management, and control. The strengthening of climate governance, in the case of Rio Grande do Sul, depends on institutionalizing coordination, data, financing, and accountability on a permanent basis.

Keywords: accountability; climate adaptation; risk management; multilevel governance.

1. Introduction

In April and May 2024, Rio Grande do Sul faced an extreme hydrological event, characterized by widespread floods that caused severe damage to infrastructure and a strong human, economic, and environmental impact. A technical publication by the Inter-American Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the World Bank (2024) recorded that 2,398,225 people were potentially affected, with 876,565 directly impacted, and the global impact was estimated at BRL 88.9 billion. This episode ranked among the costliest disasters in the state’s recent history.

The severity of the event shifted the public debate from the emergency response to a broader issue: the capacity of Brazilian public governance to anticipate, coordinate, and sustain responses to complex climate risks. At the institutional level, literature and technical diagnostics converge on the understanding that extreme events function as stress tests for governance, as they expose coordination failures, administrative discontinuity, capacity asymmetries between federative entities, and accountability fragilities. Accountability, a central concept in public and private governance and management, refers to the obligation to account for, assume responsibility for, and respond for results and decisions.

Faced with the crisis, the reconstruction and adaptation agenda was quickly formalized at the three levels of government. At the federal level, Provisional Measure No. 1,220, of May 15, 2024, created the Extraordinary Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic for Support to the Reconstruction of Rio Grande do Sul. At the state level, Law No. 16,134, of May 24, established the Rio Grande Plan and the Reconstruction Fund of Rio Grande do Sul (FUNRIGS), while Law No. 16,136, of June 3, 2024, redefined the responsibilities of the Gaúcha Reconstruction Secretariat. In Porto Alegre, Complementary Law No. 1,016, of July 4, 2024, created the Forte Porto Alegre Program, the Office of Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation, and the Municipal Fund for Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation.

However, these initiatives, established after the disaster, raise questions about the effectiveness of multilevel governance before and after the event. The final report of the Dutch Disaster Risk Reduction & Surge Support (RVO, 2024a) recommended reviewing the institutional arrangement for flood protection and studying the current and desired governance models. The Brazil-Netherlands co-creation report (RVO, 2024b) reinforced the need for cross-cutting collaboration, overcoming municipal political-administrative boundaries, and governance compatible with the regional scale of the phenomenon.

The comparison with the Netherlands offers a useful analytical parameter, as Dutch water governance was built on permanent, territorially delimited, and financially autonomous institutions. The regional water authorities, known as waterboards, date back to the 13th century and exercise operational water management at regional and local levels, with an elected governing body and their own funding through taxes. Although this model is not mechanically transferable to Brazilian federalism, it allows for the identification of institutional attributes relevant to climate adaptation, decision-making stability, and accountability.

Beyond the international contrast, the case examined dialogues with the ESG perspective from the standpoint of governance. The environmental dimension is manifested in hydrological risk and the need for adaptation; the social dimension emerges from the impacts on vulnerable populations, essential services, and urban infrastructure; and the governance dimension appears as the organizing axis of the explanation, as coordination, administrative continuity, financing, transparency, and verifiable information conditioned both the immediate response and the capacity for resilient reconstruction.

This study starts from the hypothesis that the amplified impacts of the 2024 floods were not solely due to the magnitude of the event, but also to fragilities in public governance characterized by insufficient coordination between federal levels, limited preventive institutionalization, low integration between data and decision-making, and still fragile accountability mechanisms. The secondary hypothesis posits that comparison with the Netherlands allows for the identification of institutional attributes amenable to analytical adaptation to the Gaúcho and Brazilian context.

In this context, this work aimed to analyze, in the temporal scope from May 2024 to May 2025, the public governance fragilities related to the 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul, explicating the actions at the federal, state, and municipal levels of Porto Alegre in light of the IIA’s Three Lines Model (2020), and comparing such arrangements with institutional references from the Netherlands. The specific objectives were to: identify the main normative and administrative instruments adopted after the disaster; examine how they reinforce or not aspects such as coordination, financing, data, and accountability; synthesize the convergences between the reports from DRRS, BID/CEPAL/World Bank, and REDESCA; and propose institutional improvement recommendations consistent with the comparative experience.

2. Material and Methods

This study was characterized by a qualitative, applied, exploratory, and comparative approach, seeking to analyze the public governance fragilities related to the 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul. The objective was to clarify the actions at the federal, state, and municipal levels of Porto Alegre, in light of the IIA’s Three Lines Model (2020), and to compare these arrangements with institutional references from the Netherlands. The research’s temporal scope covered the period from May 2024 to May 2025.

The unit of analysis consisted of public governance arrangements at the federal, state, and municipal levels (Porto Alegre), focusing on post-disaster response and reconstruction. The research corpus was composed of public, official, and traceable sources, prioritizing those with public access, identifiable authorship, and direct adherence to the research problem. A balanced sample of official items was organized, distributed among the Union, the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and the Municipality of Porto Alegre, to cover the federative scope.

Data collection was carried out through documentary research, covering four main groups of sources. International technical reports, normative acts, and institutional government pages were collected. Official pronouncements and communications from federal, state, and municipal bodies of Porto Alegre were also included, as well as reference documents on water governance in the Netherlands. These documents were selected for their relevance to the period and the topic studied.

In the analytical stage, content analysis was employed, as proposed by Bardin (2016). This procedure involved the phases of pre-analysis, material exploration, and treatment and interpretation of results. Thematic coding was organized into five predefined categories, chosen for their recurrence in international diagnoses and examined normative acts.

The thematic categories used for coding were: multilevel coordination; climate prevention and adaptation; data, monitoring and early warning; financing and institutional continuity; and transparency and accountability. These categories allowed for structuring the analysis of the vast documentary material, focusing on the public governance aspects relevant to the context of the 2024 floods.

As an interpretive instrument, the IIA’s Three Lines Model (2020) was applied. This model was used to comparatively examine how Brazil and the Netherlands distribute institutional roles among operation, coordination, and control. The first line was associated with operational functions, the second with instances of coordination and risk management, and the third with control and accountability mechanisms.

For data organization, a reading matrix was constructed by thematic category and federative level. From this matrix, identified patterns, gaps, and convergences in the documentary corpus were synthesized. Comparative analytical tables and a synthetic figure were developed, describing the formalized governance functions in the normative corpus, which increased the study’s reproducibility.

During the preparation of the work, artificial intelligence tools were used to support textual organization, language review, and chronological ordering of documents. All content was reviewed, validated, and rewritten by the author, who assumed full responsibility for the final content, in accordance with the institution’s Manual of Good Practices for the Use of AI.

3. Results and Discussion

The integrated analysis of the documentary corpus revealed that public governance in Rio Grande do Sul, after the 2024 floods, underwent a rapid reorganization at all federal levels. However, this restructuring was predominantly reactive, with the creation or strengthening of coordination and reconstruction bodies occurring as a direct response to the disaster. This finding suggests that the main fragility did not lie in the total absence of norms, but rather in a low density of preventive institutionalization prior to the extreme climate event, as indicated by the literature on climate governance (OECD, 2025).

At the federal level, Provisional Measure No. 1.220/2024 established the Extraordinary Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic for Support to the Reconstruction of Rio Grande do Sul, with responsibilities for coordinating federal actions, planning, articulation, dialogue, and promotion of technical studies. Subsequently, Decree No. 12.169/2024 transferred this structure to the Civil Affairs Office, maintaining its functions but reinforcing its temporary nature. This move indicated a strengthening of the federal second line of coordination and response, but without the identification of a specific and permanent climate governance instrument dedicated to the Rio Grande do Sul case within the analyzed corpus.

The performance of the National Water and Basic Sanitation Agency (ANA) deserves emphasis in this federal dimension. In 2024, the Agency registered the creation of a technical advisory group for the Rio Grande do Sul case and, in May 2025, reported the replacement of damaged monitoring equipment, the availability of real-time data on a single portal for the state, and the update of the Flood Vulnerability Atlas. The discussion on a new State Integrated Water Resources Plan, within the context of the Water Governance Pact, was also initiated. These actions reinforced the second technical and regulatory line, but, analogously, highlighted that the preventive architecture gained greater density only after the catastrophe occurred.

At the state level, the response was institutionalized with greater normative density. Law nº 16.134/2024 established the Rio Grande Plan as a program for reconstruction, adaptation, and climate resilience, structured in emergency, reconstruction, and future actions, and created the Rio Grande do Sul Reconstruction Fund (FUNRIGS). Law nº 16.136/2024 redefined the competences of the Gaúcha Reconstruction Secretariat, assigning it the coordination of planning, formulation, and execution of climate resilience actions and infrastructure recovery, in addition to executive secretariat and technical-administrative support functions for FUNRIGS.

This state arrangement was the one that most explicitly combined coordination, funding, and obligations for the disclosure of fund information, which strengthened, at least formally, the second and third lines of governance. However, this formal strengthening did not eliminate a central problem: state institutionalization was also born out of crisis. The Rio Grande Plan and the Rio Grande Reconstruction Secretariat were conceived as post-disaster responses, meaning that coordination and funding capacity were reinforced when the extreme event had already caused large-scale damage.

Thus, although the state has advanced in formalizing governance, such an advance confirms the diagnosis of low prior preventive institutionalization, and not the contrary. This observation is crucial, as it aligns with the study’s initial hypothesis, which pointed to fragilities in public governance characterized by limited preventive institutionalization, contributing to the amplification of the impacts of the 2024 floods.

At the municipal level, Porto Alegre institutionalized its own response through Complementary Law nº 1.016/2024, which created the Porto Alegre Forte Program, the Office for Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation (ERAC), and the Municipal Fund for Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation (FMRAC). Decree nº 22.817/2024 detailed the internal structure of the Office, distributing responsibilities in infrastructure projects, climate adaptation, geospatial data, monitoring, urban transformation, and economic recovery, with provisions for defining goals, evaluating results, and integrating municipal geospatial data.

In terms of the IIA’s Three Lines Model, the municipal response demonstrated an effort to reinforce the local second line, with a clearer approximation between planning, data, and project execution, although still on an extraordinary and temporary basis. The municipal case additionally highlights a classic point of multilevel governance: proximity of execution is not sufficient without vertical coordination. Porto Alegre concentrated the implementation of projects and the management of concrete drainage, pumping, resettlement, and urban infrastructure problems, but remained dependent on resources, guidelines, and articulations with the state and federal levels.

This dependency helps explain why the first local line, although closer to the problem, did not solely possess the conditions to solve it in a systemic way. Insufficient vertical coordination between federal levels is a critical point in multilevel governance, as pointed out by Nicollier, Kiperstok, and Bernardes (2023). The examination of external reports corroborated this interpretation, providing a multifaceted view of institutional fragilities.

The final report of the Dutch Disaster Risk Reduction & Surge Support (DRRS, 2024a) stated that the current institutional and legal framework was complex and recommended special attention to the review of the institutional arrangement of the flood protection system, in addition to conducting a study on current and desired governance models. The Brazil-Netherlands co-creation report (RVO, 2024b) reinforced the need for transversal collaboration, alignment of guidelines, communication, and governance among actors, as well as a structuring that transcended municipal boundaries, given the regional and metropolitan nature of the phenomenon.

The joint publication by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the World Bank (WB, 2024) recorded that the disaster response involved coordination between federal, state, and municipal governments. It was concluded that this collaboration should be deepened during reconstruction and in the preparation and risk reduction of future events, aiming to enhance the resilience of the communities in Rio Grande do Sul. The Special Rapporteurship on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights (REDESCA, 2025), in turn, acknowledged the prompt state intervention but identified significant challenges in providing clear and accessible information to the population before, during, and after the disaster.

REDESCA (2025) emphasized the need to strengthen information, communication, and early warning systems, with access to verifiable scientific information and evidence-based responses. These four sets of evidence converged on three central weaknesses: multi-level coordination still insufficiently stabilized; gaps in prevention, monitoring, and accessible pre-disaster data; and accountability still dependent on crisis arrangements, external reporting, and sectoral transparency obligations, rather than a permanent system for performance evaluation and risk governance.

This convergence, stemming from distinct sources – international technical cooperation, multilateral financing, human rights, and national regulation – pointed to similar institutional problems. This finding strengthened the study’s interpretive consistency, reinforcing the hypothesis that governance constitutes a relevant explanatory variable for the worsening of impacts, and that the mere existence of norms does not guarantee the effectiveness of the response in contexts of extreme climate risk. Reading by the Three Lines Model of the IIA

The reinterpretation of the gaucho case by the Three Lines Model of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 2020) revealed that the first line, associated with the operational functions of execution and maintenance of critical services, operated under strong pressure. Although it demonstrated responsiveness, this performance occurred in an environment marked by institutional complexity, limitations of prior integration, and the need for revision of the flood protection system. The first line, which includes civil defense, the Municipal Department of Water and Sewage (DMAE) of Porto Alegre, executing secretariats, and drainage systems, exhibited operational resilience but lacked preventive stability.

The second line, which encompasses risk management, coordination, planning, and monitoring, was the axis that was most reinforced after the disaster. The Federal Extraordinary Secretariat, ANA, the Rio Grande Plan, the Rio Grande do Sul Reconstruction Secretariat, the Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation Office, and the post-disaster funds are examples of structures that sought to integrate governmental action, produce data, plan reconstruction, and organize priorities. However, this strengthening occurred after the event, confirming its reactive nature. The system therefore needed to build or expand its second line under crisis conditions, which limited its capacity for anticipation and prevention.

The third line, concerning control, transparency, and accountability, remained comparatively less dense. Although the Rio Grande do Sul Reconstruction Fund (FUNRIGS) and the Municipal Fund for Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation (FMRAC) provide for information publicity and monitoring mechanisms, and transparency portals and institutional reports exist, external diagnoses pointed to deficits in clear and accessible information, a lack of comparable data, and the absence of robust performance-oriented accountability mechanisms.

The third Brazilian line proved to be more fragmented and reactive, while the Dutch experience offers greater institutionalization of benchmarking and monitoring (OECD, 2014). This analysis allows us to understand that the mere post-disaster normative production does not resolve institutional vulnerability by itself. Climate resilience depends on effective articulation between the three lines. A relatively active operation, unaccompanied by stable risk management and robust control, tends to act only after damage.

Similarly, coordination without accountability instruments and without a consistent informational basis runs the risk of becoming a merely formal arrangement. The Rio Grande do Sul case showed that the main challenge was not the inexperience of the institutions, but their low structural integration between the lines of defense. From an analytical point of view, the Three Lines Model showed that the vulnerability stemmed from the distance between norm, operation, and control.

In the period examined, an expansion of the second line was observed through reconstruction structures, but without equivalent consolidation of the third line and without the first line being preventively integrated into a stable risk management architecture. This imbalance helps explain the predominance of emergency responses and the difficulty of converting post-disaster actions into permanent public policy, according to the literature on institutional sustainability (Blankesteijn and Pot, 2024).

In the evaluation of multilevel governance, the analysis classified the Union at a high level in planning, due to the coordination and formulation instruments adopted after the disaster, including the Extraordinary Secretariat and ANA’s support for studies and governance pacts. The State was classified at a medium level, as, although it established a specific plan and secretariat, its performance remained linked to post-event reconstruction and adaptation. The Municipality of Porto Alegre was also classified at a medium level, but its performance proved to be more strongly linked to local implementation than to regional-scale planning.

In terms of execution, the Municipality of Porto Alegre received a high classification, for concentrating operations closer to infrastructure and urban services, such as DMAE and civil defense. The Union and the State were classified at a medium level, as their actions, in the analyzed corpus, were more associated with coordination, financing, and reconstruction than with the direct operation of local systems. In financing, the Union was classified at a high level due to its capacity for resource mobilization and federal coordination, while the State obtained a medium level for creating FUNRIGS and its induction role. The Municipality was rated at a low level due to its dependence on superior arrangements for resources.

Regarding data, the Union and the State were classified at a medium level, as the analyzed period showed an effort to reinforce monitoring and planning, but also indicated that such systems were still consolidating after the disaster. The Municipality remained at a low level, as, despite the Office of Reconstruction and Climate Adaptation, its informational capacity proved to be more recent and localized. In control, the Union was classified at a medium level due to the existence of transparency and publicity structures, although without sufficient density of specific preventive accountability.

State and Municipality remained at a low level, as their control mechanisms manifested more as formal publicity of funds and portals than as a mature performance evaluation system. The Netherlands, on the other hand, were classified at a high level in planning, execution, financing, data, and control, due to institutional permanence, their own fiscal base, systematic use of information, and relative density of benchmarking, transparency, and performance pressure described in the consulted literature. Comparison with the Netherlands

The comparison with the Netherlands, although it does not authorize an imitative solution, offered useful analytical parameters for the problem investigated. The report by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2014) on Dutch water governance recognized the existence of gaps, but highlighted attributes such as institutional stability, territorial delimitation of water authorities, permanent operational capacity, own taxation, and systematic use of benchmarking and information to guide decisions. These attributes contrast with the reactive institutional framework observed in the case of Rio Grande do Sul.

In the Netherlands, regional water authorities, known as waterboards, are ancient forms of democratic government, with members elected or appointed for four years. Their function is based on the principle of stakeholder participation and the collection of regional taxes, executing regional operational management, planning, inspection, and urban sewage treatment. This permanent and autonomous structure, with a clear territorial base and its own funding, contrasts with the dependence on extraordinary structures and political induction observed in Rio Grande do Sul, where coordination and funding were reinforced only after the extreme event (Dutch Water Authorities, 2017).

Dutch water governance combines permanent operational authority, stable budgeting, and systematic monitoring, which sustains environmental and social outcomes with greater regularity. In the case of Rio Grande do Sul, the most critical axis was governance: coordination, administrative continuity, financing, transparency, and verifiable information conditioned both the immediate response and the capacity for resilient reconstruction. The comparison, therefore, strengthens the conclusion that the problem is not just climatic, but fundamentally institutional, according to the ESG perspective.

The main comparative lesson is not the replication of the Dutch design, but the need to broaden the institutional permanence of water and climate governance in the Brazilian context. This implies clarifying competences, regionalizing coordination on a scale compatible with the hydrological phenomenon, stabilizing financing, making data and performance effectively public and actionable, and consolidating risk management arrangements that exist before the disaster. The decisive difference lies less in the post-event reaction and more in the prior decision-making and coordination infrastructure, as pointed out by Blankesteijn and Pot (2024). Integrated discussion

The initial hypothesis of the study was partially confirmed. An absolute normative vacuum was not observed, but rather an intense normative and administrative production after the crisis. What was observed was insufficient preventive institutionalization and the persistence of fragmented arrangements between operations, risk management, and accountability. The expansion of offices, secretariats, and funds demonstrated a capacity for reaction, but also revealed that climate governance depended, until then, on less robust sectoral and coordination structures than the extreme event demanded, corroborating Matias-Pereira’s (2017) analysis of contemporary public management.

From the perspective of public management, the case suggests that climate adaptation policies cannot be treated as an appendix to reconstruction. When coordination, financing, and data are organized only after the disaster, the system operates at a structural disadvantage. Reconstruction can generate institutional learning, but this learning needs to be converted into a permanent design. Otherwise, there is a risk of creating a short-lived institutionality, politically central at the moment of crisis and which can be marginalized when the public agenda shifts.

The results also indicated that the alignment between territorial and institutional scales continues to be a decisive challenge. The 2024 flood phenomenon had a metropolitan and regional dimension, but a significant part of the response was conditioned by competencies organized by municipality, secretariats, and programs. International literature and reports converge on the need for coordination on a scale compatible with the flood protection and water drainage system, which should be structured around territorial units more aligned with hydrological logic (OECD, 2025).

Another central aspect was information. The strengthening of monitoring systems, data portals, and the updating of instruments such as the ANA’s Atlas of Vulnerability and Floods occurred with greater intensity after the disaster. This suggests that integrated data, monitoring, and early warning were not sufficiently institutionalized before the critical event. Without a robust informational basis, multilevel coordination tends to operate more slowly, in a fragmented manner, and is vulnerable to asymmetries in technical and political capacity, as discussed by Pedrotti and Dornfeld (2021).

Finally, the discussion demonstrated that accountability is not restricted to the formal disclosure of acts and funds. The third line of defense demands comparable indicators, performance evaluation, information accessible to the public, independent monitoring routines, and the possibility of systematic institutional learning. The practical experience of the study, therefore, suggests that the climate governance agenda for the Rio Grande do Sul case should be less episodic and more structural, with an emphasis on institutional permanence and the integration of the three lines of defense.

The practical implications derived from the findings point to the need for a permanent multilevel coordination arrangement in the Gaúcho case, with clear attributions between the Union, State, and Municipality of Porto Alegre, and regional-scale articulation. Risk management must be integrated into the ordinary administrative routines of planning, budgeting, and infrastructure, ceasing to be extraordinary. Data, monitoring, and alerts need to be organized as a continuous and interoperable system, rather than a post-collapse response, according to the IIA’s Three Lines Model (2020).

These observations, inspired by Dutch institutional attributes such as a clear territorial base, permanent operational authority, own or stable funding, actionable data, and accountability with performance pressure, suggest that extreme events should be interpreted as opportunities for lasting institutional reforms. Climate governance, in the case of Rio Grande do Sul, depends on institutionalizing coordination, data, funding, and accountability on a permanent basis, overcoming reactive and sectoral logic to build a system of continuous learning and effective accountability.

4. Conclusion

The study analyzed the public governance fragilities related to the 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul, examining federal, state, and municipal actions within the temporal scope of May 2024 to May 2025 and comparing them with institutional references from the Netherlands. It was found that, although the three levels of government implemented a rapid institutional reorganization after the disaster, this restructuring was predominantly reactive. Low preventive institutionalization was identified, with significant gaps in multi-level coordination, data integration and monitoring before the event, and robust accountability mechanisms. The application of the IIA Three Lines Model showed an imbalance, where the first operational line demonstrated resilience under pressure, the second line of coordination and risk management was strengthened reactively, and the third line of control and transparency remained less dense and fragmented. The comparison with the Netherlands, in turn, highlighted the importance of permanent institutional attributes, such as a clear territorial base, continuous operational authority, stable funding, and systematic use of data and benchmarking, which contrast with the institutional framework observed in the Rio Grande do Sul case.

The study’s main contribution lies in demonstrating that the amplified impacts of the 2024 floods were exacerbated less by the formal absence of regulations and more by the insufficient articulation between operations, risk management, and control. The strengthening of climate governance in Rio Grande do Sul, therefore, depends on institutionalizing coordination, data, financing, and accountability on a permanent basis, overcoming reactive and sectoral logic. The work’s limitations are recognized as the temporal scope, which did not allow for evaluating the long-term performance of the created structures, and the analytical scope, focused on governance rather than the technical assessment of works. For future studies, it is suggested to conduct a longitudinal evaluation of the permanence of these structures, a comparative analysis with other Brazilian hydrological disasters, and an investigation into the relationship between public information, perceived risk, and social response in climate emergency contexts.

Bibliographic References

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); World Bank (WB). Assessment of the effects and impacts of floods in Rio Grande do Sul. 2024. Assessment of the effects and impacts of floods in Rio Grande do Sul. Technical notes at IDB-TN-03039. Available at: . Accessed: Oct. 28, 2025.

Institute of Internal Auditors of Brazil (IIA). Three Lines Model. São Paulo, 2020. Available at: . Accessed on: 03 Nov. 2025.

Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO); Dutch Disaster Risk Reduction & Surge Support (DRRS). Final report Porto Alegre, Brazil. The Hague, 2024a. Available at:

Article originating from the Course Conclusion Work of the Specialization in Compliance and ESG of the MBA USP/Esalq

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