Digital Business
September 29, 2026
The paradox of independents: ownership, distribution, and control in the Brazilian music market
The Paradox of Independents: Ownership, Distribution, and Control in the Brazilian Music Market
Barbara Viana Souza; Frederico Reis Pacheco
DOI: 10.22167/2675-6528-202602705
Article derived from a Final Course Work (TCC), with content based on the student’s original work and adapted to the editorial format of the E&S Magazine with the support of the ResumeAI tool, an artificial intelligence solution developed by Instituto Pecege for textual synthesis and organization.
Abstract
The presence of independent artists in the Brazilian music industry has expanded in recent years, accompanied by changes in the structures of music circulation in the digital environment. The study analyzed the paradox of independents: the possibility that independent ownership of phonograms does not correspond, to the same extent, to equivalent control over distribution. The research adopted a quantitative and descriptive approach, based on the mapping of 1,143 records of Brazilian tracks that made up the monthly Top 50 of Pro-Música Brasil between January 2024 and December 2025, analyzed through descriptive statistics. The results showed that independent ownership remained relatively stable throughout the analyzed period, while distribution remained more concentrated among the three majors in the two years observed. It was also observed that some independent agents used distribution structures linked to major record labels to access the segment with the highest consumption, a configuration that remained present in both years analyzed. In this context, it was concluded that independence does not present itself as a fixed position, but as a condition defined by how the repertoire articulates with the systems that organize its circulation, evidencing a persistent asymmetry between ownership and distribution.
Keywords: Market concentration; Music distribution; Music economy; Record industry; Streaming.
1. Introduction
The music industry has undergone a significant restructuring in recent decades, driven by the digitalization of production, distribution, and consumption processes. After the crisis caused by the transition from physical media to the digital environment around the 2000s, streaming has consolidated itself as the main consumption format for recorded music, resuming the sector’s growth (IFPI, 2024). In addition to impacting music circulation technologies, this transformation has redefined the commercial and organizational dynamics of the record industry, affecting the performance of artists, record labels, and digital platforms (De Marchi, 2023).
In this context, the music industry witnesses a historical expansion of the independent market. In 2024, global revenues for independent record labels reached US$10.7 billion, representing an 8.2% growth compared to the previous year. Growth in the streaming sector for independents was even more expressive, reaching 8.4%, surpassing the 5.4% advance recorded by the three majors in the same period (Mulligan, 2024). According to the Loud & Clear 2025 report, the independent segment accounted for more than half of the royalties generated on Spotify that year, totaling over US$5 billion. This strengthening of the independent sector is often interpreted as evidence of technology-driven democratization.
According to this narrative, streaming platforms have reduced entry barriers, allowing artists to distribute their works globally and connect with their audience without relying on major record labels (Frenneaux, 2023; Spotify, 2025). However, this discourse may obscure an important debate about the structural dynamics of the current market. According to platform capitalism, power tends to concentrate in the agents that control the infrastructure, and not necessarily in those who hold cultural assets (Srnicek, 2017). Watson and Leyshon (2022) reinforce this argument by identifying in the trajectory of the music industry a recurring pattern of reintermediation, in which the promise of internet disintermediation is continuously replaced by the emergence of new intermediaries, from peer-to-peer networks to streaming, and today to MusicTech technologies. Mediation, therefore, does not disappear, but is reconfigured.
Brazil presents particularly interesting conditions for empirically examining this paradox. As the fourth largest streaming market in the world (Luminate, 2026) and the eighth largest global music market (IFPI, 2025), the country is relevant in scale and unique in its consumption dynamics. During the first half of 2025, 77.1% of tracks played in the country came from national artists, compared to the global average of only 33.3% in the same period (Luminate, 2026). The prominence of local repertoire, in a market of global dimensions, makes the Brazilian context especially relevant for examining how independence in ownership and distribution control relate in the highest consumption segment.
Although there are global reports and diagnoses on the music industry, the Brazilian context remains relatively unexplored from this perspective. There is a consolidated tradition of studies on the historical trajectory of the national phonographic industry (Dias, 2000; Herschmann, 2010), the impacts of digitalization (Vicente, 2012; De Marchi, 2012; 2016a), the limits of democratization promoted by digital platforms (Gonzaga e Castro, 2023), and the role of mediation in musical consumption (Kischinhevsky, 2016). However, these approaches tend to operate in a segmented manner, without systematically integrating the analysis desired by this work, which is that of the ownership of phonograms and the control of digital distribution. This gap highlights the need to investigate the potential mismatch between the ownership of phonograms and the control over their digital distribution, particularly for independent artists.
Given this gap, this work aims to empirically analyze the mismatch between phonogram ownership and control of digital distribution in the highest-consumption tracks in Brazil. By mapping 1,143 records of Brazilian tracks that made up the Pro-Música Brasil monthly Top 50 between January 2024 and December 2025, the study examines what has been termed the independent paradox, that is, to what extent does ownership independence translate into autonomy in distribution. By shifting the focus from ownership to circulation mechanisms, the work seeks to highlight how different dimensions of power are articulated in the structure of the contemporary music market.
2. Material and Methods
The research adopted a quantitative approach and descriptive character, with the objective of analyzing the structure of the Brazilian phonographic market in the segment of highest streaming consumption. The study focused on the mismatch between the ownership of phonograms and the control of digital distribution in the most consumed tracks. The methodology was adequate to measure the phenomenon in the complete repertoire (Gil, 2002). It was characterized as documentary research, based on publicly accessible secondary data, using the official monthly rankings of the Top 50 from Pro-Música Brasil as the primary source (Gil, 2002). Pro-Música Brasil consolidates streaming data from the main digital platforms, compiled by BMAT.
The initial empirical universe corresponded to monthly entries in the Pro-Música Brasil Top 50 between January 2024 and December 2025, totaling 1,200 observations. The unit of analysis was the occurrence of a track in the ranking in a given month. The prolonged stay of a track in the Top 50 translated into more observations, reflecting the monthly presence of agents in the highest consumption segment.
Pro-Música Brasil’s rankings included for each track the variables of position, artist, title, phonogram holder, and digital distributor. The data were collected manually and organized into a structured spreadsheet. International tracks were excluded from the analytical set, totaling 30 in 2024 and 27 in 2025, resulting in 1,143 observations of Brazilian tracks. The exclusion was justified because they operate under distinct global contractual structures.
The temporal scope was delimited to the full years of 2024 and 2025, ensuring comparability, as the digital distribution variable began to be systematically recorded in July 2023. A methodology based on counting tracks present in the monthly ranking was adopted, instead of market share analysis, offering a complementary angle to international indicators (Mulligan, 2024). The classification considered two dimensions of the phonograms: ownership and distribution.
Following IFPI and ABMI criteria, labels and distributors linked to the three major global groups (Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group), including their subsidiaries, were classified as majors. The remaining agents were classified as independent. The identification of the controlling shareholder was carried out by consulting official websites and public records. In cases of distinct commercial brands, the criterion of corporate control prevailed.
The combination of the two dimensions generated four configurations: Major-Major (vertical integration), Major-Indie (major outsources distribution), Indie-Indie (full autonomy), and Indie-Major (independent label distributes via major’s subsidiary). The Indie-Major configuration constituted the central empirical focus of the work. Descriptive statistics were used as the analytical method (Stevenson, 2001), given the analysis of the complete universe of data.
The analyses covered the participation of majors and independents in the dimensions of ownership and distribution, the mismatch between them, the prevalence of the Indie-Major configuration, the cross-matrix of the four configurations, and the combined participation of majors, calculated separately for ownership and distribution. This metric specifically summed the participation of the three named majors, following the convention adopted by industry reports (IFPI, MIDIA Research). The results were compared with international benchmarks (Mulligan, 2024; CMA, 2022; IFPI, 2024).
The research presented methodological limitations. The data universe was restricted to the monthly Top 50, a high-consumption segment, not representing the digital music market as a whole, as it excluded tracks with lower stream volumes. The binary classification major and indie did not encompass intermediate corporate structures. The analysis covered two full years, without allowing inferences about long-term trends. During the preparation of the work, Claude (Anthropic) was used for support in textual organization and linguistic review, with the author assuming full responsibility for the final content.
3. Results and Discussion
The analysis of 1,143 observations, corresponding to monthly entries in the Pro-Música Brasil Top 50 between January 2024 and December 2025, revealed distinct dynamics in the dimensions of phonographic rights ownership and digital distribution. There were 570 observations in 2024 and 573 in 2025, with the data organized to examine the configuration of the highest consumption segment in each period. The investigation sought to identify variations over time and articulate the findings with the literature on reintermediation in the phonographic industry and platform capitalism, according to the central objective of the study.
Ownership of phonographic rights
In 2024, the ownership of phonographic rights in Pro-Música Brasil’s Top 50 showed a notable balance between major labels and independent agents. Of the 570 observations analyzed, 291 (51.1%) were linked to the three majors, while 279 (48.9%) were of independent ownership. This pattern of balance was maintained in 2025, with 296 (51.7%) of the 573 observations belonging to the majors and 277 (48.3%) to independents, indicating a minimal variation of only 0.6 percentage points compared to the previous year.
These findings corroborate the literature that discusses the reduction of entry barriers in music production in the digital environment, as pointed out by Hesmondhalgh (2021) and Wikström (2020). Digitization has simplified the processes of recording, mastering, and releasing phonograms, making them more accessible to independent labels and artists. This has allowed these agents to reach the mainstream consumer segment with a frequency that would be less likely in the traditional phonographic industry model, suggesting a more decentralized and accessible phonographic production.
Despite the greater accessibility in production, it is fundamental to recognize that production and distribution are distinct stages in the phonographic chain, each with its own structures and power logics. Negus (1999) argues that the music industry is organized by different cultural and organizational practices, where ownership of a phonogram does not, in itself, determine the distribution channels or the agents responsible for its access to platforms. This distinction is crucial for understanding distribution as an autonomous dimension, which will be explored next.
Digital Distribution
The analysis of digital distribution revealed a more concentrated market structure than that observed in the ownership of phonograms. In 2024, 375 (65.8%) of the 570 observations were distributed by agents linked to the three majors, while 195 (34.2%) circulated through independent distributors. In 2025, this concentration showed a slight reduction, with 354 (61.8%) of the 573 observations distributed by majors and 219 (38.2%) by independents. The 4.0 percentage point variation in distribution, in contrast to the stability of ownership, highlights that these dimensions have distinct dynamics in the market.
In the context of streaming, digital distributors act as essential intermediaries, connecting phonographic production to consumption platforms. They are responsible for ensuring the availability of the repertoire, managing metadata, administering catalogs, and coordinating releases, structuring music access to digital environments. Furthermore, they play a central role in mediating information and monetization flows, centralizing consumption data and operationalizing revenue collection and remittance, which makes them crucial in organizing the circulation and value generation of music (Wikström, 2020).
Concentration in digital distribution is organized around a restricted number of agents. In 2024, The Orchard, linked to Sony Music, was responsible for 19.1% of observations, followed by Universal Music Group with 14.6% and Sony Music Entertainment with 13.5%. Among independents, oneRPM stood out with 11.6%. In 2025, Universal Music Group increased its share to 19.2%, while The Orchard registered 18.5% and oneRPM remained stable at 11.7%. Believe, also independent, increased its share from 5.6% to 7.7%.
The rise of SoundOn, TikTok’s distribution platform, was also observed, growing from 0.7% in 2024 to 4.5% in 2025, indicating the emergence of new intermediaries in the digital market. On the other hand, Ingrooves, linked to Universal Music Group, registered 2.5% in 2024 and no occurrences in 2025. It is relevant to note that some distributors operate under brands that do not immediately reveal their affiliation with large corporate groups, such as The Orchard and Altafonte, controlled by Sony Music Entertainment, and Ingrooves, part of Universal Music Group. This arrangement reflects the strategy of large groups to operate through multiple subsidiaries and distinct brands along the value chain, maintaining incorporated market identities (Hesmondhalgh, 2021).
The data show that digital distribution in the highest consumption segment remains concentrated among a limited number of players linked to the majors, even with the growth in the relative share of independent distributors. This concentration, although accompanied by a slight reduction in the majors’ share in 2025, is still substantially higher than that observed in ownership. The following section delves deeper into this analysis, examining the mismatch between ownership and distribution and the resulting configurations.
Structural matrix and the mismatch between ownership and distribution
The comparison between ownership and distribution revealed a persistent mismatch in independent participation in the ownership of sound recordings and in the control of their circulation. In 2024, while independent agents held 48.9% of the entries in the ranking in terms of ownership, their participation in distribution was 34.2%, resulting in a difference of 14.7 percentage points. In 2025, independent ownership varied little, reaching 48.3%, but independent distribution advanced to 38.2%, reducing the difference to 10.1 percentage points.
This data indicates that, even with relatively stable independent ownership, it does not translate into an equivalent presence in the distribution channels of the highest consumption segment. This trend is consistent with global data from MIDIA Research (Mulligan, 2024), which estimated a 12.5 percentage point gap between the share of agents not affiliated with the majors in ownership (46.7%) and in distribution (34.2%) in 2023. Although the metrics differ (revenue vs. observation count), the pattern of misalignment between ownership and distribution is convergent and relevant in the Brazilian context.
To detail this dynamic, the observations were classified into four configurations by combining ownership and distribution. The Major-Major configuration, representing complete vertical integration, totaled 291 observations (51.1%) in 2024 and 296 (51.7%) in 2025, remaining stable. The Indie-Indie configuration, denoting full autonomy, grew from 195 observations (34.2%) in 2024 to 219 (38.2%) in 2025. The Indie-Major configuration, where independent agents hold ownership but use distributors linked to majors, registered 84 observations (14.7%) in 2024 and decreased to 58 (10.1%) in 2025. No Major-Indie cases were observed in either year.
The absence of the Major-Indie configuration throughout the analyzed period is an expected pattern, given that majors generally operate with their own distribution structures, while independent agents resort to the majors’ infrastructure. This gap in the highest consumption segment highlights the asymmetry in market organization. The Indie-Major configuration, in particular, constitutes the main analytical result, showing that part of the independent agents, to access the highest consumption segment, depends on distribution structures controlled by major record labels.
In 2024, Indie-Major observations were relatively evenly distributed among Warner Music Group (33.3%), Altafonte/Sony (32.1%), Ingrooves/Universal (16.7%), and The Orchard/Sony (16.7%). In 2025, Warner Music Group concentrated the majority of these observations, with 62.1%, followed by Altafonte (19.0%) and The Orchard (17.2%). Ingrooves, which represented a significant share in 2024, registered no occurrences in 2025. The coexistence of Indie-Indie and Indie-Major configurations suggests that, although many independent agents operate outside the major structures, circulation in the higher consumption segment is also associated with these infrastructures, indicating that distribution autonomy is not uniform in the analyzed market.
This scenario reflects the transformations in the music industry post-digitalization, characterized by a recurring pattern of reintermediation, as described by Watson and Leyshon (2022). The internet’s promise of disintermediation is often replaced by the emergence of new intermediaries, from peer-to-peer networks to streaming and MusicTech technologies. Major record labels, rather than being displaced, have repositioned their operations, using control over intellectual property rights to negotiate with platforms and become the main rentiers of digital networks.
The data suggest that this pattern of reintermediation is not restricted solely to catalog control, but also manifests in the distribution dimension, especially in the highest consumption sector. The dynamics between configurations indicate that control over circulation infrastructures is increasingly relevant in market organization. This points to a scenario where the diversity of independent agents on the market surface coexists with the maintenance of concentrated structures at deeper levels of the production chain. However, the study does not allow us to infer the specific reasons for these arrangements, nor to distinguish between strategic decisions and structural constraints.
The repositioning of the majors is evident, as their activity extends to the points of articulation between repertoire and market, not depending exclusively on control over catalogs. This occurs through distributors that, although frequently associated with the independent segment, are integrated into broader corporate structures. Examples include The Orchard (Sony), ADA (Warner), and Virgin Music Group (Universal), which allow the majors to participate in the circulation of repertoire beyond their own catalogs, expanding their presence in the chain without necessarily expanding their ownership.
The analysis developed up to this point suggests a dissociation between the distribution of property and the organization of circulation in the music market. This dissociation is a central aspect for understanding the power dynamic. The following section quantifies the extent to which circulation in the segment with the highest consumption is organized around a restricted set of agents, deepening the discussion on distributive concentration and its relationship with the overall market structure.
Distributive Concentration and Market Structure
The analysis of distribution in the highest consumption segment reveals that the repertoire circulation remains highly concentrated in a restricted group of agents. The combined participation of majors in distribution reached 65.8% in 2024 and 61.8% in 2025. This measure reflects the relative presence of agents in the insertions of the highest consumption ranking, and not the traditional market share based on revenue or total volume of streams. Although there was a reduction of 4.0 percentage points between the two years, concentration levels remain high, which is consistent with patterns of oligopolized markets, where a few agents control a significant share of the activity (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Complementary reading is obtained by analyzing the combined participation of the three majors in the ownership of phonograms, grouped by controlling economic group. This participation was 51.1% in 2024 and 51.7% in 2025. Although this level of concentration is lower than that of distribution, it is still significant, indicating that the main groups maintain a relevant presence also in the ownership dimension. Sony Music, for example, represented 30.4% of major ownership in 2024 and 27.1% in 2025, while Universal Music Group had 14.6% and 19.2% in the respective years.
The direct comparison between concentration in ownership and distribution highlights the central asymmetry of the study. In 2024, major companies’ ownership was 51.1%, while their share in distribution reached 65.8%, resulting in a difference of 14.7 percentage points. In 2025, major companies’ ownership was 51.7%, and distribution, 61.8%, with a difference of 10.1 percentage points. These indicators, considered together, suggest that the market operates on two simultaneous levels: among major companies, concentration is high in both ownership and distribution; among independent agents, presence in the ownership of phonograms does not translate, to the same extent, into presence in distribution channels.
Patterns of high concentration are also reported internationally, as in the British market, where the combined share of the majors is equally high in terms of revenue (CMA, 2022). The data from this study, therefore, do not indicate a break with the presence of major record labels, but rather a change in how this presence manifests in the market. The asymmetry observed between ownership and distribution, with distribution being more concentrated, configures the paradox of the independents, where autonomy in ownership does not guarantee the same level of control over circulation in the highest consumption segment.
Implications: Independence as a Relational Condition
The results presented indicate the need to qualify the notion of independence in the contemporary context of the Brazilian music industry. The relevant and stable presence of independent agents in the ownership of phonograms, observed in the two years analyzed, does not correspond to equivalent autonomy in the organization of market access, especially in the segment with the highest consumption. This dissociation is supported by the literature on cultural industries, where Hesmondhalgh (2021) points out that these sectors combine high levels of concentration with the continuous entry of new agents. This explains why the expansion of the productive base does not imply an equivalent transformation in the structures that organize market circulation and visibility.
In the Brazilian context, this pattern is part of a longer process of reorganization of the phonographic industry. De Marchi (2016b) discusses how the expansion of independent production has always accompanied technological transformations and rearrangements in the production chain, but in an environment already structured by consolidated intermediaries. The emergence of new agents does not occur in a vacuum, but in a field where market access conditions are already organized. Vicente et al. (2018) observe that the entry of large international players in Brazil generated an additional layer of intermediaries responsible for enabling the insertion of local repertoire into global circulation circuits, which tends to produce new forms of hierarchy in the cultural market in local contexts.
These results suggest that independence, in this scenario, is less a fixed position and more a relational condition, which varies according to the dimension observed, be it ownership or distribution. This distinction has direct implications for the measurement of the independent market. Reports from IFPI (2024) and ABMI (2020) classify the majors as the three major multinational groups and their subsidiaries, and other players as independents, based on phonogram ownership. However, these methodologies do not capture the structures through which the repertoire effectively transits, nor through whose hands revenues are generated.
Such definitions do not systematically record the role of distribution structures in public access, a central dimension for understanding the insertion of agents in the highest consumption segment. This methodological gap is confirmed by the presence of the Indie-Major configuration and the combined participation of the majors, which maintain relevant concentration in ownership, but to a different degree than in distribution. This highlights the coexistence between the stable presence of independent agents in ownership and the persistence of concentrated structures in distribution, an asymmetry that traditional methodologies do not capture.
This landscape is contextualized by recent consolidation movements in the sector. The acquisition of Som Livre by Sony Music in 2021, for example, not only incorporated a historical catalog but also consolidated an existing distribution relationship through The Orchard, a Sony subsidiary (Istoé Dinheiro, 2021). Similarly, the acquisition of Downtown Music Holdings by Virgin Music Group, a division of Universal Music Group, in 2026, integrated one of the largest service platforms for independent artists and labels, including CD Baby and FUGA, under the control of a major (Universal Music Group, 2026; Billboard, 2026; ABMI, 2026).
These movements are not isolated phenomena. Water & Music has documented since 2020 a growing pattern of acquisitions, where major record labels, technology platforms, and private equity funds progressively expand their control over the infrastructure that organizes music circulation (Hu, 2025). This cycle, compared to the ouroboros, indicates that controlling this infrastructure has become as strategically relevant as owning the rights to the repertoire itself. Although these processes are not explained by the data in this study, they constitute the structural context in which the results are situated.
The main implication of this study is not only the identification of a mismatch between ownership and distribution, but the suggestion that the concept of independence, as operationalized by the main sectoral metrics, may be insufficient to describe the market reality. When the infrastructure through which music circulates is progressively absorbed by large groups, repertoire ownership may remain independent, but market access and monetization of what has been produced depend on structures that these agents do not necessarily control. Naming this distinction precisely is a relevant step for sectoral research and debate.
In summary, the study revealed that the presence of independent agents in the ownership of phonograms in the largest segment of Brazilian music consumption remained relatively stable between 2024 and 2025. However, digital distribution showed a significantly greater concentration in the hands of the three major record labels, evidencing a persistent mismatch between ownership and control of circulation. The Indie-Major configuration, where independent artists use the distribution infrastructure of majors, underscores that independence in the music industry is a relational condition, shaped by how the repertoire articulates with circulation systems, rather than a fixed position of full autonomy.
4. Conclusion
This work aimed to empirically analyze the mismatch between phonogram ownership and the control of digital distribution in the highest consumption segments in Brazil, examining what has been termed the paradox of the independents. It was found that independent ownership remained relatively stable in Pro-Música Brasil’s Top 50 between 2024 and 2025, with approximately 48% of entries. However, digital distribution proved to be significantly more concentrated among the three major record labels, which accounted for 65.8% of distributions in 2024 and 61.8% in 2025. This asymmetry revealed a persistent mismatch between ownership and circulation control, with a difference of 14.7 percentage points in 2024 and 10.1 percentage points in 2025. The Indie-Major configuration was also observed, where independent agents held ownership but used distributors linked to majors to access the highest consumption segment, representing 14.7% of observations in 2024 and 10.1% in 2025. The study’s main contribution lies in proposing an analytical matrix that crosses ownership and distribution, highlighting that independence in the music industry is not a fixed position but a relational condition, defined by how the repertoire articulates with the systems that organize its circulation.
The research presents some important limitations, such as the data universe restricted to the monthly Top 50, which does not represent the entirety of the digital phonographic market, excluding tracks with lower streaming volumes. The binary classification between major and independent, although consistent with regulatory methodologies, does not encompass intermediate corporate structures, such as minority stakes or exclusivity agreements. The two-year time frame, while sufficient to identify variations, does not allow for inferring long-term trends or future projections, nor distinguishing between strategic decisions and structural constraints that lead to the observed arrangements. For future studies, a qualitative approach is suggested to investigate the reasons that lead independent agents to use distribution structures linked to majors. It is also recommended to expand the temporal scope of the analysis and investigate the effects of recent acquisition movements on the distributive structure, especially the incorporation of distributors and aggregators by large groups, which can significantly alter the repertoire circulation arrangements.
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